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APSTRACT
We develop a model of aggregate supply and demand in the open economy
to explain the important characteristics of international macroeconomic
adjustment in the 1970s. Traditional demand—oriented models cannot account
for the worldwide phenomenon of rising inflation and unemployment in the
mid—70s, or for the failure of most industrialized economies to recover
from the deep recession of 1974—75. When aggregate supply is carefully
treated, it is found that much of the inflation and sluggish output per-
formance may be attributed to the jump in the real costs of intermediate
inputs and the failure of real wages to adjust downward after the input
price shock. A simulation model shows that fuel inputs are sufficiently
important in production that a large part of the worldwide recession may he
attributed to the change in the relative price of oil, since 1973. In an
empirical section, it is suggested that countries differ in their response
to supply shocks and macro—policies because of differences in key stuctural
relationships, particularly in wage determination.
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SUPPLYVERSUS ULMAND APPROAChES TO TILE PROBLEM OF STAGFLATION*
INTRODUCTION
Thispaper deals with the co-existence of inflation and unemployment in
industrial countries in the l970s. The period since 1972 marks a departure
from the previous decade in more than one important respect. It began
with an extraordinary spurt of inflation that in many countries is only
now receding. The inflation has been marked by great divergences in rates
between countries. It seems to be generally agreed that the oil crisis
and related events had a lot to do with this upsurge in prices and that
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of pegged rates had a lot to •do
with the subsequent divergence of inflation rates. What is much more marked
and less well understood is the pronounced decline inoutput growth which started
with the worldwide recession of 1974-75. The GNP growth of the OECD
countries came down to an annual average of 3 per cent during 1973-78,
compared with about 5 per cent in the preceding decade. Productivity growth
rates came down even more, capital accumulation is still lagging, and above
all, unemployment rates, which more or less doubled since the l960s, are
on average still as high to-day as they were in 1974-75.
A prerequisite for enlightened economic policy discussion is a
*Thepaper is based on ongoing research by the two authors at the Falk
institute for Economic Research in Jerusalem and the National Bureau for
Economic Research in Cambridge, Mass. Partial support from the Ford
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The paper benefited from helpful
discussions with and comments by 0. Blanchard, M. Feldstein, E. Malinvaud,
and J.Tobin.+ -2- +
reasonableunderstanding of the recent past, not only because past
events might recur, but because it seems as if the industrialworld has
not yet recovered from the 1974-75 episode. Themost natural reaction to
persistent unemployment, for a world broughtup on Keynes, is to think of
itpurelyin terms of a shortfall inaggregate demand. The oil pricehike
undersuch a view, can be lookedupon as an excise levied by OPEC on the
industrial world, not enough of which has beenspent to keep cconomc
activity at earlier levels. According to this view theslack may be fully
eliminatedwith a sufficient boost to demand on a co-ordinatedworld scale
(leaving aside special problems such as theuneniployment of the young or
other particular social groups). Inflationpersists because of strong
inflationary expectations following the commodity boom, butthe inflation-
unemployment trade-off of the Phillips curve must, in thisview, bring
inflation down. A more monetarist point ofview, according to which there
is no such policy trade-off, gives areasonably good account of divergences
in inflation rates between countries but is hardput to explain persistent
unemployment.
In ourview,stagflation cannot be understood onlyinaggregate demand or
purely monetary terms. Accelerating goods prices and increasingunemployment
suggest the co-existence of demand pressure in the commodity market and excess
supplyinthe labour market.' This is precisely thenatureofa real supply
IStagflationcould be defined in terms of alternative combinations of
either increasing or persistently high levels ofunemployment and inflation
(see Blinder, 1979).Rather than sticking to a specific definition we
prefer to state the events we are trying to account for: during 1973-75
both unemployment andtherate of inflation increased simultaneously;
since 1975inflation has been tapering off while unemployment remains high.+ -3.. — +
shock,suchaswascausedbythe rise inoil and raw materials prices in
l972..74.2 An increase in the price of a variable factor of production, such
as oil, may reduce profits, output, and the input of other variable factors,
such as labour, unless their relative price adjusts downwards. If real.
wages are sticky, which, by and large, they have been, unemployment will
result.
Such a recession can further be exacerbated by restrictive domestic
demand management, which may be required to combat inflation and rising
current-account deficits, and by the accompanying fall in investment demand.
It is precisely because of the existence of demand-induced elements that
it is all too easy to attribute all of the unemployment to Keynesian
factors, although a large part it is really of a 'classical' nature.
That part caii only be eliminated by a fall in real wages or increased
capital accumulation, neither of which is likely to occur in the shortrun.
Because supply shocks are a fairly complex and new problem alarge
part of our paper (Section I) is devoted to a theoretical discussion of the
effect of supply and demand shocks in a representativeopen economy and the
various policy responses to them. This is done bymeans of a diagrammatic
exposition of a model presented in greater technical detailelsewhere.
It is followed in Section II by a brief study of global considerationsand
multi-country interactions.
2Therelative prices of raw materials have since dropped buck to their
previous level, but the higher level of relative oil prices has so far
persisted (see Table 5 in Section III).
For earlier studies ofthe problem in a closed-economy context, see
Gordon (1975), Phelps (1978), and Solow (1978).+ -4—
One may believe that a supply shock will reduce output in the short
run without being convinced that the 1973 oil-price rise played a major role
inthe world recession that followed. The quantitative evidence of Section
III argues that it did. There we present a realistic simulation model (for
a representative economy and for a two-country world) and some econometric
estimates of important relationships (labour market behaviour, investment
demand, etc.) for seven major industrial economies. It is important to
stress that countries will differ in their response to supply shocks and
macro policies precisely because of differences in one or more of these
key structural relationships.5
The analysis in this paper is almost exclusively short-run in nature
An important issue, the long-term repercussions on capital accuiiiulation,
is only mentioned in passing. Likewise the long-run effects of current-
account imbalances and the important structural effects on developed
economies of LDC industrialization are left out of the present paper.
Both Mork and Hall (1978) and Hudson and Jorgenson (1978) have found
substantial real effects of energy price changes for the United States.
Separate studies by the authors of this paper (Bruno, 1979, and Sachs,
1978) have dealt with aspects of these relationships in other OECD
countries. •
For example, the United States may be characterized by nominal wage
rigidity and may therefore be more output—responsive to monetary policy.
Many European countries would be better described in terms of real wage
rigidity and are therefore more likely to translate money growth into
an immediate price rise.It is certainly a mistake to base one's views
on observations of only one country.+ -5- +
1.2'JIE REPIiESENTATIVE OPEN ECONOMY
Anunderstanding of stagflation necessitates a careful specification of
at least two markets, the market for final domestic goods and the labour
market. Our analysis here is based on a model that was laid out and
discussed in much greater detail elsewhere (Bruno and Sachs, 1979,
henceforth MEA). We shall concentrate mainly on a simplified diagrammatic
exposition, leaving the algebra and a quantitative amplification to Section
III.
While discussing the individual economy it is easiest to consider
external market conditions as exogenously given; this assumption is relaxed
in Section II. We distinguish between two exogenous condriodity prices, the
foreign price of intermediate goods, later to be represented by energy,
and the foreign price of final goods. These prices, in logarithmic form,
will be denoted by p* and respectively. The relative price will be
denoted by ir (=p*
-p*)•6Intermediate goods are used as a major input
(n) in the domestic production of final goods (q), together with labour
()andcapital (k). Intermediate goods may also be produced domestically
6Weshall use lower-case letters to denote logarithms of upper-case
variables. Thus p* is the log of the price level and Ttisthe
lg of 11n =p*/p*,etc. The time derivative of a log variable will thus
be the proportional rate of change of the underlying original variable
[e.g., =(dP/dt)/P=rateof inflation].+ -6- 4
at the given world price and such import substitution(or even net export)
mayprovide one source of international differences inindustrial structure.
Thesingle domestic final good, q, whose price isp, will beanimperfect
substitute for the foreign final good in bothconsumption and exports. The
domesticprice of the foreign good is (p* + e),where e is the exchange
ratein domestic currency per unit offoreign exchange. The relative price
of the final good (-- e),or the terms of trade, will be one
important endogenous variable to be determined in thecommodity market.
¶heCommodityMcrrket
Theanalysisof the domestic final goods market (Figure1) is best conducted
interms of the quantity supplied and demanded of the finalgood, q, and
its relative price, ir, as defined above.Determination of i =p
-e-p*)
is tantamount to the determination of the realexchange rate (e -p).In
order to conclude something about the behaviour ofthe absolute price level,
p, we still need a theory to determine the nominalexchangerate, e.
Under a fixed exchange—rate regime itcan be considered exogenous while
under a float it will be determined bymoney and an asset market and
therefore outside the commodity market. This willbe discussed separately.
For the moment we only have to remember thatp =ir+ p* + e and that for
given final goods price (p*) and given exchange rate(e) any change in the
terms of trade (ir) implies an equal change in theprice level (p).It is
ar:alytical convenience that suggests using irandq, rather than p and
q,on the two axes in Figure 1.
Next we note that in looking at thecommodity market we take the real+ -7- - +





a -In this and subsequent diagrams we adopt the following conventions: A
parameter will be written on the side of a curve according to the
direction in which a positive change in it will shift the curve. A
variable enclosed in a diamond is exogenous (at least in the short run),
in a rectangle it is directly determined by policy, and in a circle,
it is endogenous for the model as a whole. Thus, w is in a circle















q0 q+ -8- +
wage(w)7 to represent the labourmarket as a given parameter. Thereal
wage niay be considered the equilibrating
variable when the labour market
is in disequilibrium, but it isusually characterized by downwardrigidity.
Its relatively slowspeed of adjustment justifies using itas a given
parameter in drawing an aggregate short-runsupply curve for the commodity
market, rather than assuming labourmarket clearance.8
Given a three-factor
aggregate production function9 q(n, 2,k)and
assuming that firms minimizecosts, one can deduce a short-runmarginal
cost schedule which is linearly
homogeneous in the prices of the variable
factors (w and andis a negative function of thequantity of capital
(k), which is fixed in the short
run. Assuming prices (p) to beproportional
to marginal costs and makingsuitable transformations in terms ofthe
relative prices T[,iT, andw, we can draw the commodity supply schedule
in the ir-q space.
The curve marked S in Figure 1
indicates the aggregate supply of
final goods. In the shortrun, with capital, k, held fixed, it should in
principle be upward Sloping but one wouldexpect it tobe reasonably flat
This is here defined as the nominal
wage, w, divided by the price of a
consumption basket which consists of bothimported and domestically
produced final goods, which inlog terms isw w -
- [Ap+(1-A)(p*+e)](for details see MEA).
8Analternative, which for the purposes of thepresent diagrammatic
exposition would not be very different, isto consider the norniiwlwage
as. the given parameter (the meaning of thecommodity supply curve will
alter accordingly). In Section III belowwe shall make the corresponding
empirical distinction betweenwage-wage and wage-price linkage.
This will be further specifiedas a two-level CES function (see
Section III).+ 9 +
when the economy operates below capacity. As indicated earlier thesupply
curve is here drawn with the relative price of the intermediate good
(ii =- p*)and the real wage (Wc) as given parameters. Any increase
in one of these raises variable production costs and therefore shifts the
S curve up and to the left, while any increase in the capital stock will
shift the curve down and to the right.
Let us next briefly summarize the demand side of the model. Consider
the main components of final demand: private and public consumption,
investment, and exports. Private consumption of the domestic good is
considered a positive function of real disposable income and a negative
function of the terms of trade (iTp -e-p*)•Exports are similarly a
positive function of world income (y*) and a negative function of rr.
Investment is considered a negative function of the externally given
real interest rate, R*, and a positive function of the rate of profitJ°
Once this subsystem is solved out it can be summarized in theforri of
ademand schedule, drawn in Figure 1 as a downward sloping curve D for
a given set of parameters. This curve will be shifted up and to the right
by an increase in external demand (y*), or by domestic fiscal policy (Z).'
Similarly a shift down and to the left may be caused by an increase
in the real interest rate (R*) or by an increase in the real wage (we).
The assumed sign of the latter in the demand curve comes from its supply
effect on the production and use of intermediate goods and through
10Money might also affect the system through the investment channel. More
on this in Section III.
'1The fiscal variable is. expressed in terms of the combined relative
effect of government expenditure and taxes.
.+ -10- +
investmentdemand.12
Therole of the relative foreign price of intermediategoods is
ambiguous, because of conflicting forces at work. A rise in at a
given production level of intermediate goods will depressthe real income and
consumption of a net importer of these goods while the substitutioneffect
and a possible increase in the domesticproduction of intermediate goods
will work in the other direction. For a netimporter of intermediate goods
thedemand curve is thus likely to
shift to the left with an increase in ii.Fora net exporter of n
intermediate goods or for an economy in which there isconsiderable domestic
substitutability the shift may go in the other direction.'3 Formost OECD
countries the first is the more likely.
Consider now the effect of two kinds of possiblechanges in the system.
An import price shock,, involving an increase in therelative price n'
shifts the supply curve unambiguously to the left(see the shift from S
to St in Figure la), leading to excess demand of theamount AA' at the
initial price ir.lf, as was suggested, demand also contracts as a direct
effect of the rise inTr ,excessdemand will be reduced, but the new n
equilibrium at point A will in any case involve a reduction inoutput.
What will happen to the relative price iris not clear; if, as is likely,
the supply curve is relatively flat and the effecton the supply curve
12Ifthere are marked differences between thepropensities to consume out
of wages and out of profits the direction might be reversed.This
possibility is ignored here.
For the same reasons the demand curvemay itself be upward-sloping (see
MEA).+ -11—
- +
dominatesthe demand shift, x will rise;'4in the
opposite (and for an OECD economy less likely) case, where import prices
are demand-expanding, the terms of trade will obviously rise but the net
effect on output is ambiguous.
Consider the importance of the degree of real wage stickiness in
this analysis. While we have not yet considered the labour market, it is
clear that unless there is a strong substitution effect, anoutput
contraction will reduce labour demand and press downward on realwages.
Assume now that nominal wages are downward flexible or that the unexpected
price shock causes a momentary reduction in real wages. In that case there
will be a force working in the commodity market in exactly
the opposite direction to that of the import price shock (consider the
signs attached in Figure 1 to shifts in we). One would obviouslyexpect
to find different patterns of real wage response to the import price shock
in different countries (see Section III).
It is important to point out that this analysis of the effect of a
rise in import prices is confined to the short-run implications. For
example, a fall in the rate of profit and a contraction in output, in
addition to their immediate effect on investment demand (see below),may
eventually cause a fall in the capital stock, k. Also, changes in the
current account may have repercussions on domestic real wealth, thereby
affecting the demand curve. These are ignored here.
Weshouldremember that the absolute price level, p. may rise even when
the relative price, rr, falls, provided the domestic price of the final
export (import) good, p +e,rises sufficiently (which has certainly
happened in all OECD countries in the 1970s).+ - 12-
Thecommodity market representation of the effect of a supply shock
is the key to an understanding of the difference betweenstagflationary
effects of the kind that affected OECD economies in theearly 1970s and
the more conventional business-cycle demand fluctuations whichare either
inflationary or deflationary in both commodity and labour markets.
A rightward shift in the demand curve will by itself raiseprices (unless
we are in a flat section of the supply curve) as wellas final output
and employment (unless we are hittinga fullemployment ceiling);
But consider now the more relevant case of a demandcontraction coming
from either domestic demand restraint (Z)or from a contraction in world
demand (y*)• In Figure lb this is represented as a shift of the demand
curve from D to D' causing excess supply of the amount AA at the
given initial price ratio fl.
Ifprices are downward flexible the relative price would fall toir,
with equilibrium at A'. But suppose prices (p) arerigid so that at given
and e, the relative price stays temporarily at u. In thatcase
output would be constrained by demand and would fall from qto q, with
unemployment of the conventional Keynesian kind resulting (see further
discussion below in the labour-market context). Firms would liketo sell
more but are unable to do so. At point A(Figure ib) they are, at least
temporarily, not on their supply curves. This is in marked contrast with
the previous case where output contraction originates from asupply shock.
During the 1974-75 recession there was clearly a combination of a
supply shock with a concomitant demand contraction coining from the
cumulative income reduction in all OECD countries. This wascompounded
by a fall in investment and in some countries (notably the United States)+ -13- +
bydomestic fiscal andmonetaryrestraint as well. For this reason it is
easy to fall into the trap of attributing all of the unemployment to a wore
conventional demand contraction combined with downward price rigidity. As
pointed out by Malinvaud (1977), until recently the experience of the
industrial countries has been confined to alternations between situations
of Keynesian unemployment or inflation. The developments of 1973-75 mark
a departure from this pattern.
An import price shock, as we have seen, is most likely tocause a
rise in the relative domestic price levelp -e- Fora given e
and p* the nominal domestic price level will rise. However, it is
important to note that neither the observed price rise nor the intercountry
differences in inflation rates since 1973 can be explained withoutrecourse
to the monetary mechanism and exchange—rate behaviour under a flexible rate
regime. For the determination of e, attention must focus on theasset
markets,to whichweturn briefly.
Current theory and available evidence stress that the exchange rate is the
relative price of national moneys. One important element ofexchange-rate
determination is then the relative growth rates ofmoney stocks. Our model,
like most, has the characteristic that amoney supply increase in one
country leads in the long run to an equiproportiona]. depreciation of its
exchange rate and a rise in its domestic prices. Since p and e rise
by thesame amount, p-e-pand output are unaffected in the long run
by themoney supply increase.
Intheshort run, though, the determination of domesticprices and
theexchange rate ismore complicated. Let us tracethrough the effect of aOne—
shot increase inthe domestic money supply. Initially,domesticinterest+ -l4 +
ratestend to fall. But given world capitalmobility, there is an attempt
to transfer funds to world assets, which havea temporarily higher rate of
return. With floating rates, the exchange ratedepreciates (e rises);
in fact, e continues to rise until theexpected returns of domestic and
foreign assets are again equalized.
As e rises, import prices and theconsumer price level rise. If
nominal wages are sticky, w -
PCfalls and the terms of tradeworsen,
i.e., p -e-pfalls. Domestic prices do not immediately risein
equal proportion to e. Asreal wages are restored, w
increases, pushing up the domestic price level intheprocess. Eventually,
p and e rise in the same proportion as the original
money supply change.
If the real wage is fixed in the shortrun, then the domestic price level
almost immediately rises in proportion to thedepreciation. This is, of
course, the familiar vicious circle of depreciation and domesticinflation.
Once it is recognized that a significantpart of the rccession was
classical and supply-determined, i.e.,directly tied to too high real wages,
the inflationary consequences ofexpansionary monetary policy are highlighted.
It is important to remember, though, thatexpansionary monetary policy may
have some effect on output in the shortrun, and that for countries like
Canada and the United States, with sluggish nominalwage change (see Section
III), the inflationary effects of themoney expansion might initially be
small.
The threekinds of shift discussed here (importprice shock, exchange
rateadjustmentsand demand contraction) go quite a longway in explaining
both the deep recession of 1974-75 and theintercountry differences in
rates of inflation. But before turning back to theselet us consider the+ -15- +
implications for thelabourmarket, which in many ways mirrors the effects
already considered in the commodity market.
The Labour Market
ThecurveLd inFiguie 2 representsthe usual downward slopingmarginal
product curve here expressed in terms of the realconsumption wage (w) rather
than the real Product wage (w -p).'5The curve is derived from thecommodity
supplyschedule. The direction of the shift caused bychanges in the
relativeprice ris again ambiguous because of the conflicting income and
substitution effects. It should be noted, however, that finalgoods
production may fall with a rise in and yet labour demand may rise if
the substitution effect is strong enough(see, for example, Hudson and
Jorgenson, 1978). However, the most likely case foran OECD country with
low elasticity of energy Substitution isan unambiguous leftward shift in
the demand curve for labour.In Figure 2a, which illustrates such a shift,
the result is excess supply (unemployment) of theamount BB at the
initial level of real wage w
A new equilibrium full employment at B' could bereached after a
process of downward real wage adjustment. Alternatively, ifcapital is a
complementary limiting factor, capital accumulation mighteventually help
to shift the labour demand curve back and thus reduceunemployment. It is
doubtful whether such a corrective mechanism wouldcome about by itself,
15 This is doneto conform to the concept of realwages that is most
appropriate from the point of view of labour supply behaviour(see
























andin any case either adjustment process would be slow to come about.16
Another option for a single country, at least in theory, would seem to
be the adoption of an expansionary fiscal policy, in the commodity
market this is represented by a rightward shift of the demand curve leading
to an increase inbothoutput (q) and prices (andtherefore p). As
thefinal goods price also appears as a parameter of the labour demand
curve (see Figure 2), this expresses itself as a shift back to the right
ofthe Ld curve and a reduction in unemployment. The impliedcost
in higher pricesand a greater current-account deficit makes this an
unlikely policy to follow for any length of time. Besides, as we shall
see below (Section II) it cannot be adopted by all supply-shocked countries
simultaneously;when the relative price,ir, rises in one country it
must fall in the rest of the world.
If output in the commodity market happens to betemporarily constrained
on the demand (and not on the supply) side, which is the Keynesian
case, producers will not be on their supply curve and the
relevant demand schedule for labour will be represented by thesteeper
curve marked L in Figure 2, whose position will be determined mainly
by the demand variables (y*, Z).17
16Asfar as capital accumulation is concerned, the movementwas, if
anything, in the opposite direction (see Section JIl).
17Thecapital stock, k, and the relative price, r, now appear as leftward
shifting variables while iris again ambiguous but more; likely to
shift the curve to the left. The relative slopes of the curves Ld
and Lare implied by the assumption that the positiveresponse of
output supply to a fall in real wages dominates the response of output
demand.- 18- +
+
Thecase of a pure demand shock (see the shift from to Ldin q q
Figure 2b), with rigid real wage, brings about Xeynesianunemployment of
the amount BB, if Ld stays put. The caserepresented in Figure 2a
may more appropriately be termed classical unemployment, having been caused
by a shift in the whole marginal product schedule. With bothtypes of
shocks present in the 1974-75 recession itis,of course, difficult to
assess how much of the unemployment at any point in timeor in any specific
country may have been Keynesian orclassical,18but it is important to
stress that given the existence of a supply shock,unemployment cannot be
cured only in a Keynesian fashion, for reasons that havealready been
mentioned and to which we shall return later.
General Equilibrium
The determinants of the exchange rate and the concomitant development
of the balance of payments have been described only briefly. In 1EAwe
modelthe deterininnts of the exchange rate under the assumption of perfect
capital mobility.
To get a better idea of howthe variousparts of thesystem
are linked, consider a simplified flow-chart of our representativeopen
economy (see Figure 3). The top part of the chart shows the main links
from the costs of production (raw materials and labour) to theprice level
(positively) and the level of output (negatively). Output in turn affects
thedemandfor labour and imports. Both the demand for and thesupply of
labour are affected bythe(real) wage rate which in turn isadjustedin
18 Inthe example of Figure 2b there is Keynesianunemployment BB over
and above the classical unemployment BB.+ - 19-
8 Dashedlines ———indicatenegative effect.
+







a dynamic process by the resulting disequilibrium in the labour market as
well as by the extent of price-wage linkages. Lower down, the chart
indicates the mainlinksfrom the demand side (fiscal and monetary policy,
exports) to output. The direct link to prices is likely to be weaker if
the supply schedule is relatively flat. The foreign sector is represented
by the components of demand for real imports'9 andexports;these are domestic
or world income as well as the real exchange rate •and foreign prices.20
Theexchangerate, in turn, may in principle be affected by both the
balance of payments (capital flows are not directly shown) as well as by
monetary policy, in case of a float.
The 1973-75 story can be started from an exogenous increase in
external import prices (see the bottom part of the chart). Domestic import
prices, which are also determined by changes in the exchange rate, affected
the price-wage-price system and led to an output reduction. The latter was
exacerbated by an accompanying demand shock largely caused by a contraction
in the world market. Countries differed in theirresponse because of
differences in three inaor areas: the nature of the price-wage linkages,
the effects on the current-account balance and the closely relatedmonetary
policy and exchange rate response. The latter accounts for a substantial
part of intercountry differences in inflation rates.
19 No separation into intermediateand final imports is shown here nor is
the link from the domestic price level shown.
20 The link from thecurrent account to the exchange rate has not yet been
modelled in our empirical study. This has so far been confined to the
case of perfect capital mobility.+ —21- +
[nrpirical Preview
Aflow-chart such as Figure 3, thoughsimplified,may still obscure
the most important issues. The feeling of notbeing able to see the wood
for the trees may intensify as we proceed, in thenext section, to discuss
a quantitative simulation model. One may-sometimes get a nutshell
description of what has been happening even with the aid ofone curve and
a very small reduced-form model, albeit at the cost ofconsiderable
oversimplification. Before we plunge into detail let us thereforeconsider
a summary figure with a familiar pair ofaxes--average inflation rates
and rates of deviation of manufacturingoutput from capacity growth.
Figure 4 traces the main average developments for sixmajor OECD countries,
excluding the United States2' (Canada, Japan, France, Germany,Italy, and
the United Kingdom). As is wellknown, the poj.nts followed what looked
like a reasonably well-behavedPhillips curve in the 1960s; the plot
starts curving back in 1969, with a fairly flat upward drift in both
inflation and output deviation. From 1972-73on one obtains the perverse
bell-shaped curve, which is familiar from the experience ofso many
countries.22
21TheU.S. data, taken by themselves, also.show avery similar general
-
pattern.The following analysis is based on Bruno (l79).Capacity
estimates are based on Artus (1977).
22
Adiagram of exactly this kind,averaging the figures of sevenmajor
cOuntries, as well as individual country pictures appeared in the
McCracken Report (OECD, 1977). It is worthnoting that the Report had the
figure drawn only up to 1976, with an arrow (and aquestion mark) pointing
in a clear southwest direction signifying thehoped-for move "towards
price stability and full employment." Subsequentdevelopments in 1977
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By1978 the average rate ofinflation had receded tojust l)e1ot the
1973 rate, having reacheda 15 per cent peak (with afairly hide range of
amplitudes,e.g., 25 per cent for Japan, Italy, andthe United
Kingdomand only 7-8 per cent forGermany). However, average unemployment
(hererepresentedin terms of the rate ofoutput deviationfrom capacity)
isstill as high as in 1975.
whatisthe simplest kind of model thatcan explain such unusual
behaviour? The broken line inFigure 4 is a prediction based ona simple
two-equation semi-reduced_form model estimatedon the basis of a pooled
regression of 60 observations of rates ofchange (six countries over the
ten-year period 1967-77).
The price equation is
=J.0l+O.5S +0.17*+0.lS+D.U)I (R2 =0.82) c 0.010.06C 0.02 fl0.01. 0.05
andthe output equation
=U.01 - U.l7(-)+ 0.92Z+ (i.l6(ii-r)+ 0.32k 0.010.05 11 C —i0.'.6 —10.08 c —i
(R2=0.67).
SmallnieraIs are st..tndard errors. Thevariables as measured arep=
* . 23 Consumerprices (p is lagged one year), p =dollarimport prices,
e =exchangerate, m =moneysupply (M), q =manufacturingoutput,
=p
+e=domesticimport prices, Z =shareof government deficit in
GNP,xtotal exports (all variablesexcept Z are in logarithms)
23 Hereno distinction is made betweenimports of intermediate and
final goods.+ - — 1
Theprice equation can he derived from a straightforward price-
adjustment relationship with price expectations and a wage-adjustment
equation built into It.2k The output equation is based on the
output-adjustment relation involving both the negative import cost-push25
and the various demand—pull elements (fiscal and monetary policy, export
demand). The model is highly simplified and suffers from some obvious
statistical deficiencies (one serious problem is that of pooling different
countriest observations into one regression).26 However, it does give
quite good tracking of the curve in Figure 4.It should also he noted
that the 1978 prediction is a true prediction lying outside the sample
period 27
Suppose there is no change in import prices and exchange rates
= == 0).In that case the pair of price and output equations
2L+ The abovepair of equations was selected frbm a preliminary empirical
study (Bruno, 1979) in which a number of alternative equations were
estimated for prices, output, wages, and the exchange rate. When a
money-determined exchange-rate equation is substituted for the exchange
rate in the price equation during the floating period (after 1972), the
end results are similar. An attempt to put in separate
demand elements (Z) into the price equation failed. Even money by
itself is barely significant. Its main role after 1972 seems to come
via the exchange rate effect on import prices.
25 Realwages came out negative but statistically nonsignificant and were
therefore deleted from the equation.
26 The studyattempts to deal with this by introducing dummy intercepts or,
in some cases, allowing for different slopes.. The best alternative,
which we have followed here, is to look in greater detail into the
experience of individual countries.
27 The modelwas also used to texplaint price and output developments in
the United States, which have followed a similar pattern.+ -25- +
shouldtrace patterns that would look moreor less like conventional
Phillipscurve behaviour. •Ihe main drivingforce bchind thesystemin
thel970s was import prices,28 whicharethe important missing third
dimension in Figure 4. Their sharpmovements have Pushed prices up and
output rrowthdown,with lagged wage and price adjustmentsdelaying the
exit from accelerated inflation.
It can be seen from the output equation thata change in the relative
price(p1/p) of the order of 30-40 per cent as in 1973-74 inducesa
5-7 per cent drop in q. This accounts forbetween 40 and 60 per cent of
the reduction in manufacturing growth in thesecountries in the 1970s, with
worlddemand and domestic fiscal and monetary restraint
making up varying
amounts of the rest. The rise in the relativeprice of at least •one major
input, energy, has not been reversed since 1974. Thisexplains, at least
partly, that while inflation rates were back tpre-1973 levels by 1978,
considerable unemployment remains in thesystem. It is a 'real' structural
phenomenon, not one that can be explained, orcured, by purely monetary
or even fiscal means. In Section III wepresent a more detailed quantitative
attempt to trace the dynamics of a macro system underalternative external
shocks. But before that we have to extend theanalysis to the many-country
case.
28With the exchange rate providinga major source of the intercountry
differences in inflation rates.+ - 26- +
rr.THEINDUSTRIALWORLD AND MULTI-COUNTRY INTERACTIONS
Oncewe move from a single economy to the whole industrial world neither
the world price, level nor world income can be assumed to remain exogenous.
Countries can no longer be assumed to determine their ternis of trade and
real incomes independently of each other. In what sense then, if at all,
can one aggregate the effects of exogenous shocks across countries?
Before considering multi-country interactions it is helpful to discuss
a highly abstract model in which the whole industrial world is aggregated
into one consolidated economy producing a single final good q at price p,
and trading with a single 'OPEC' hich is assumed to command sufficient
monopoly power29 to determine the relative price (n =p
-p)of its only
export, the intermediate good.3°
Since there is no distinction betweendomestic and traded final goods
the real product wage (w -p)is now the same as the real consumption wage
w andtheworld final-goods supply schedule can be represented as a
function of the real wage (we), the relative intermediate goods price (Tr)
and the exogenous capital stock (k).3' If OPEC can fix and the real
29 This assumption is crucial for what follows, and it seems to be realistic
as far as oil prices are concerned.
30 All nominal variables will be expressed in unitsof the single industrial
world currency (SDRs, say) so that in terms of the previous model we can
yiritee =0,p =p.We ignore the existence of other L[)Cs.
31 In the log-linear case which forms the basis for the underlying
quantitative model one can write the supply curve in the form: qS
=
-b(p1
-p)-c(w-p)+k.In the present simple world model this can
also be written as q5 =_h1r
-cw
+ k.+ -27- +
wageis rigid, aggregate supply is unambiguously determined. The aggregate
supply curve can be drawn as a vertical line in a price-quantity diagram
(see curve S in Figure 5). Note that it is the absolute world price
level that now appears on the vertical axis.
To obtain an aggregate demand curve we follow logic similar to
that applied earlier to the single country case, but, with some
modifications, Instead of taking the real world interest ratc(R) as
given in the investment function we can write R =- ewhere iis
the nominal interest rate and e are inflationary expectations. Next
we solve for the nominal interest rate by appealing to a money-market
equilibrium condition.32 After substituting in the investment function and
using a Keynesian aggregate demand framework the quantity demanded
can finally be written as a negative function of real import prices(Tin) and
the real wage (we) and as a positive function f the various demandshifting
elements: fiscal policy (Z), exports to OPEC (x), the realmoney stock
Cm -p)and price expectations (be)In the p-q diagram this will be a
downward sloping curve D with nominal Cm) rather thanreal(m -p)money
as one of the parameters.33
Consider now an exogenous increase in the relative import price
Ttn'
The supply curve shifts leftward from S to S', while the demand curve
will most probably also shift to the left (from D to D'). The extent
of the shift depends on the real wage response, as before. The equilibrium
point will move from A (q, p) to B (q, p).
32 Thiscan be written in the form m -p=Oq
-Oi.
A similar closed-economy framework was recently used byPhelps (1978)
to analyse the implications for monetary policy of anexogenous
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Thereare a number of important points to note. Consider first the
unambiguous contractionary effect on output which is wholly supply-
determined, given real wage rigidity. The effect on the price level is
more ambiguous since it depends on the relative strength of the impact
effect on real income and demand as against its effect on supply.3
Withthenew equilibrium at B, what will happen if an attempt is
made to boost demand? An accomodating monetary policy can be represented
as an increase in m shifting the demand curve back to D. All that would
happen in this case is a further rise in the price level to the full amount
of the increase in the money supply (see the move from B to E in
Figure 5, with prices rising to p). Fiscal policy (Z) will likewise
raise interest rates and force up prices by a crowding-outprocess. Finally,
greater recycling of OPEC surpluses can here be represented by an increase
in x, again with no expansionary effect on out'j)ut. If the industrial
world is on its supply schedule, an increase in output can come aboutoniy
as a result of a fall in real wages or a rise in the capital stock.
Is this a realistic description of the main factors underlying the
recent world recession? Let us repeat two qualifications. First, note
that to the extent that there is nominal wage rigiditymonetary policy may
cause real wages to fall, through a price rise, and thus have an expansionary
effect. The second, more important, point is that there could be a
Keynesian recession on top of a classical one. Suppose, for example, that
theleftward shift ofthe demand curve takes the form of a further moveto
D" (becausethe effect of the supply shock on real income is stronger or
'Italso depends on what happens to the expectations term (he) and
exports (x).+ -30-
because of excessive contractionarypolicy). With prices rigid at p,
say, the extra fall in output from cto qmarks a Keynesian type of
demand deficiency with moreunemployment in the labour market. It is only
the BC (q-q)portion of output slack in Figure 5 that could beaken
up by non-inflatioi-iaryexpansion of demand. Again there is a hardcore
(q-q)that cannot be eliminated.
Looking at the industrial world as onecountry obviously precludes
discussionof some important questionsrelating to the interactions between
different industrial economies. Short ofspecifying a more elaborate
multi-country model we shall consider briefly thecase of two interacting
industrial countries of the kinddiscussed in Section j35
Suppose now that relative prices are defined inrelation to a world
final-goods price p, measured in some unit ofaccount (e.g., SDR). Assume
also that the world final-goods price level isdefined as a weighted
average [log-linear with weights y and (1 -y)]of the two country export
prices, so that we can write p =y(p-e)+ (1 -'y)(p
-e).We thus
have =p*-*, p-è- and
2
=- e-p*(where e
and eare the two exchange rates),
36Itfollows that the two relative
A simulation model based on sucha framework is further discussed in
Section III. The two supply curvescan be written as
q =air-bit -cw +k
1iiIn ic1
and
q =air-bit -cw +k.
2 222fl2C2 2
36 An
alternative definition of the ternis of trade ofcountry 1 would be
in relation to the other country'sexport price: ri' (p -e)
-(p-e).
It is easy to transform one definition intothe other by noting that
ii=(1-y)ir'.It is it'thatis the measure used in our empirical
study.+ - 31- +
final-goodsprices itand
2are constrained by therelation
+(1-y)it=0.Consider the case in which the two countries are
the same size. We get: TI+ TI =0or ii=-it.Wecan now go back
1 2 1 2
to the two separate supply curves and by substitution obtaina two-country
real output frontier,37 marked TS in Figure 6.
This curve differs from a conventionalproduction possibility
frontierin that the realcosts of labour (w,w)andthe real cost of
CI C2
imports(TI)ratherthan their quantities appear as parameters.
A rise in TI shiftsthe curve inwards from ISto TS'if
the two real wage levels are downward rigid.Suppose the original world
equilibriumwas at pointA onthe curve TS (for determination of the
demand side see below) and as a result of animport price shock is now at
A' on IS' after a contraction ofoutput in both countries. But suppose
the second country now attempts to regain itsprevious output level (q)
by boosting its domestic demand. Quite independently ofany balance of
payments problems (to which we turn later) this can only take place at the
expense of the first country's output since a gain in one country's terms
of trade must be the other country's loss (shift fromA' to B in Figure 6).
This highly simplified argument again shows the fundamentaldifference
between a supply shock which affects the structure of theindustrial world
and between demand shifts which, except fortemporary Keynesian Situations,
can ultimately be no more than beggar-my-neighbour cures. Given the rise
The following equation is obtained from the two in note 3:
aq +aq =-(ab+ab)ir -(acwacw )+ak+ak 21 1 2 21 1 2 2 1 C1 3 2 C2 2 1 1 2—nJ. - + +







init,ashift back of the TS curve can only be brought aboutbyadomard
adjustment in the real wage in at least one of the countriesor by capital
accumulation.
Is there any point in co-ordinated worldexpansion except to prevent
beggar_niy_neiglibour results? Again the answer is that whena supply shock
is accompanied by demand contraction, thesystem may well find itself,
temporarily, in a Keynesian unemployment situation. Itterms of Figure 6,
this would be represented by a point suchas C inside IS'. Expansionary
policy may then increase output in oneeconomy without necessarily causing
a contraction in the rest of the world (see themovement from C to 13
in Figure 5). One reason why thismay very well require co-ordinated
expansion has to do with the current-accountimplications of confiningan
expansion to one country while the other remainsstagnant. We shall turn
to some quantitative simulations ofa two-country world at the end of
Section III.+ -34— +
III.fl]ULATICIv MODEL AND EM?1RIC.4L ANALYSIS
The graphical analysis of Section I is based on the detailed model in MEA.
Inthis part of thepaper we discuss the empirical relevance of the same
model.First, themodel's parameter values are selected to describe a
'representative'OECD economy. Theresponse of this economy to a doubling
of oil prices is studied under a variety of assumptions about labour
market dynamics. A second economy is then added and we illustrate how
multi-country interactions affect our numerical estimates. Throughout this
section, we also appeal to the country data to support the general structure
of the simulation model (for further empirical results, see Saclis, 1979).
The simulations convey a clear message: fuel inputs are sufficiently
important in production, and the 1973 oil pricE rise was of such magnitude
that a large part of the 1974-75 recession is directly attributable to the
change in the relative of oil. While monetary policy was contractionary
in most countries in 1974, the simulations suggest that even with
accommodativepolicy the 1974-75 recession would have been severe, with
significant classical unemployment.
The dynamic response andlong-runbehaviour of the economy after ar
OPEC-like disturbance are shown to depend heavily on the behaviour of
wages, both nominal and real, For our small representative economy, with
world prices and income given, a fall of I per cent in the long-run real
wage increases employment by 0.65 per cent. The approximate doubling of
the real price of oil in 1973 is calculated to require a 6.4 per cent
decline inrealwages to maintain employment in the home economy. In the+ -35. +
two-countrysetting, the wage effect is even more powerful. When real
wages fall by 1 per cent in both countries, output in each increases
by
2.3 per cent. The doubling of oil pricesrequires a 3.5 per cent decline
in real wages in both countries for fullemployment to be restored.
In Section I, we suested thatan economy's response to external
shocks is influenced by a few key structuralcharacteristics. For example,
the more dependent theeconomy is on net fuel imports, the more
aggregate demand declinesafter an oil price increase. Indrawing lessons
from the representativeeconomy, it is important to keep in mind how
individual OECD economies differ from theaverage case. In addition to
the price simulation model, then,we describe in this section key structural
differences between the OECD economies thatmay explain some of the variety
of macro-economic experience in thepast six years.
The Representative Economy:Aggregate Supply
In this part, parameter valuesare assigned to the theoretical model. On
the supply side, domestic finalgoods are produced with labour, intermediate
inputs, and fixed capital. For theempirical simulations, we treat fuel
as the only intermediate input. A two-levelproduction process is specified.
Capital and labour combine to produce valueadded; in turn, value added
and fuel are used to produce the finaloutput: q q[v(, k), n]. For
concreteness, the value-added relation, V, andgross output, q, are described
as constant.elastjcity_of.5ubstjtution functions oftheir respective
arguments (see note 38).
The role of oil prices inaggregate supply determination depends on
the extent to which labour and fuelcan substitute for the fixed factor k.+
Suppose, for instance, that capital and energy are used in fixed proportion;
while capital and labour are partially substitutable. Then oil is also a
fixed factor, tied to capital. The cost of a marginal unit of output is
just the labour cost, since fuel and capital costs are fixed; fuel prices
do not enter marginal cost. Alternatively, suppose that oil is used in
fixed proportion to output. The share of fuel costs in the marginal unit
of output is then equal to the share of fuel costs in the average unit of
output, i.e., the share of total fuel costs in total revenue. In general,
the less substitutable is n for k relative to the substitutability of
2 for k, the smaller is the effect of fuel prices on marginal cost)8
Most empirical evidence suggests a low short-run elasticity of
substitution of capital and energy, 0k' and a somewhat higher elasticity
The technical argument is as follows, For a two-level CES production
function we write final output Q as a CIS function of value added, V,
and intermediate input,N. In turn V is produced according to a
CES function of L and K (fixed). Thus, QP =aV+(1
-a)Nand
V' =bL+
(1 -b)X,with c =(1-pY1and =(1-
p1Y1.The
01s are, respectively, the elasticityofsubstjtutjonofV. N and L, K; they
are linear functions of the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticities a, a, and
1 k9. kn
a. Now, 0ki = +(1-) (a -a),and 0kn = = a,where
=(BQ/N)(N/Q) =
PnN/PQand is the share of costs of input Nin total
revenue.Also let a=WL/PQbe the share of costs of L in total
revenue.Then, inMEA (p.6) we show p =(a'+ 'Y'(a'w +'p+q),
where a' =(1-a-)'ccx> 0,'= (1-a-)'3cr> 0,and
=a'(l-1[ocL+0(1-a-3)].The effect of fuel costs on
marginal cost is given by = t/(l+s').Itis then easy to
see that Bp/pincreases as G/O increases. In turn 0/01 rises
with 0k/0k In the fixed-.proportion case, a/a =0,and P/p =
Fora/at -°,we have J),/p -1.In the simulations,°kZ =
0 a =0.2. kn 9n+ -37.. +
ofsubstitution of capital and labour,GkR,.39 ork and hall (1978)
assume that energy is used in fixed proportion tooutput, while value added
is a Cobb-Douglas function, i.e., labour andcapital have constant shares.
We relax the first assumption, allowinga 1 per cent increase in the real
price of energy to decrease the energy—output ratioby 0.2 per cent. We
keep the assumption of a constant equilibrium share oflabour in value
added.
The aggregate production technology isfully specified by selecting
initial factor shares for labour,energy, and capital. For the
representative economy, the labour share in value added isput at 0.69,
and the capital share at 0.31. At initialequilibrium, the marginal
efficiency of capital is set at 0.1per cent (Feldstein and Summers, 1977,
calculated VIaK =0.11for the United States). The ratio ofcapital to
value added is then equal to 0.31/0.1 =3.1.A good approximation for the
share of fuel in the grossoutput of the major OECD economies is 0.05.0
"Mork(l978a, p. 29) finds =1.06,and =-0.14for 1075 (fou1thquater)
assuming putty-putty technology. Our assumption ofa two-level production
process requires weak substitutability of K, L, and N(see Arrow, 1974,
on the bearirg of weak substitutabilityon the existence of a value-
added function). The assumptionrequires 0kn =akP t'1ork finds that
-0.14 = = 0.14for 1975/IV, calling into question theexistence
of a real aggregate value-added function.
The net input of energy is measuredas the sum of net imports of energy
and the domestic production of primaryenergy (ignoring inventory
-;accumulationof primary energy). Net importsaremeasuredby the net
trade of ISIC category 3, 'funeral fuels'.To this is added domestic
production (from U.N., World Energy Supplies1977) valued at world
prices. For 1975, energy inputs as apercentage of GN1 were found to
be: United States, 9.3; UnitedKingdom, 9.9; France, 4.6; Germany, 6.1;
.1.+ -38- +
This share increased substantially after the 1973 oil price hike,
indicating low short-run substitutability of energy for other factors.
We assume for simplicity that there is no domestic production of energy.
After normalizing the variables at initial equilibrium the main
aggregatesupply equationsare given by:
(1) q =0.617+0.55+0.OSn
(2) p =-0.359+0.946w+°°54n + 0.44q.
Thefirst expression is the (log) linear approximationof aggregate supply.
Fora fixed capital stock, a 1 per cent increase in labour input raises
output by 0.65 per cent, and a 1 per cent increase in fuel use raises output
by 0.05 per cent. Equation (2) is the price equation for a profit-
maximizing firm.Factor prices are extremely important in determining
the output price. Wage costs are almost fully passed through: with our
assumptions, a 1 per cent increase in nominal wages causes a 0.95 per cent
increase in output prices. About 5 per cent of a fuel price increase shows
up in the final-goods price.' The level of output also affects p.
Because the capital stock is fixed, marginal costs increase with output,:
each 1 per cent increase in output raises the marginal cost, and the
f
Italy, 7.1; Canada, 6.3; and Japan, 5.4. To the extent that domestic
prices arebelowtheworld level, themeasureof energy inputs will be
biased upward.
The coefficients of w and p are related to the relative
elasticities of substitution, as shown in note 38. If o=a
kn ki
instead of our assumption that a a ,thecoefficient of p
kn k2
would be 0.07, while the w coefficient would fall to 0.93.-39- +
1rice,ofoutput by 0.44 per cent. 42
Itis illuminating to rewrite (2) as asupply function:
(3) q =0.82-2.15(w-p)-O.l2(p-p).
This equation describes output as adecreasing function of real factor
costs. For a given product wage (thewage deflated by domestic output
prices), a 1 per cent increase in the relative price of oilcauses
aggregate supply to fall by 0.12. Let us now introduce the(log) consumer
price index, as a weighted sum of domestic andforeign final-goods prices,
with respective weights 2/3 and 1/3,
(4) PC =O.667p+O.333(p*+e).
We can now rewrite output supply asa negative function of the real wage,
a negative function of the world price of fuel, and-apositive function of




42Econometric studies find asignificant effect of energy prices on final-
goods prices (see Mork, 1978b, for U.S. price equations). Onthe other
hand, positive output effects on prices have not beenas clearly
dcnionstrated (seethediscussionin Mork, l978b, p. Il).In our own
econometricwork, reported in Sachs (1979), we find that a fixed-markup
e4uation, i.e., one without output effects, does not describe the
1974-75 price behaviour adequately. Ina markup price equation a dummy
variable for 1974-75 is consistentlynegative. This suggests that the
recession did in fact lower markups, as equation (2)predicts.+ -40- +
WageDetermination
Theaggregate supply side is closed bypositinga wage-determination
process. It was shown inSectionsI and II that the response of wages to
the oil shock is crucial for the dynaniic adjustment of output. Real wages
must fall after a supply shock for full employment to he maintained. To
theextent that nominal wages adjust slowly to price movements, part of
that real wage decline can be effected through expansionary monetary policy.
To theextent that wages are indexed, so that real wages adjust slowly
while nominal wages are flexible, monetary adjustments lead only to
compensating price movements, without affecting real output. Indeed, if
real rather than nominal wages are rigid, a sustained period of unemployment
might be necessary to restore equilibrium wage levels after a. supply
disturbance (see also Bruno, 1978).
Many writers have speculated as to whethr actual wage processes are
more accurately described by wages following past wages (wage-wage process)
or current price expectations (wage-price process). The wage-wage process
corresponds to nornina7rigidityin that the real wage can be affected by
anticipated monetary policy. We speculate that the wage-wage process results
in large part frbm the existence of overlapping long-term contracts in the
labour market.43 Until the mid-1970s, aggregate real wage growth was so
constant that the two hypotheses could not be econometrically distinguished.
The increased variability in real wages since 1973 allows a partial answer tO
the question. Indeed, the evidence suggests that different, countries have
significantly different degrees of nominal rigidity.
See Taylor (1978).It will be shown later that of the large OECD economies,
only the United States and Canada exhibit a wage-wage process. Only in
these two countries is there widespread use of overlapping long-term
labour agreements with relatively little indexing.— 41—
Inour empirical work and in the Simulationmodel1 nominal wage
change is made a function of exl)ectedprice changes, lagged wage changes,
andthelevelof unemployment. The (log) nominalwage change is written
as (where subscript -l indicates one-periodlag)





Weassume that firms are never rationed in thelabour market so that
observedlabour input, £,equalslabour demand. Workers supply thedemanded
levelof labour services, though thedemand might be gr-'ater or less than
their desired (notional)supply, £.Wagesthen respond to thegap between
£ and jS; the rate ofadjustment is given by a.
Notional labour supply is a functionof real wages and exogenous
variables such as populationgrowth and the labour force participation
rates of various demographic
groups. For the sInu1ation model we merely
consider pS to be linear inw -p,holding other exogenous influences
Constant:
• S 7) =a(w -p)+a a > 0. 3 C
3
When ais large, labour supply iselastic and long-run realwages do
not move much. For a =0,we have the traditional assumption ofinelastic 3
long-run labour supply.
The level of a determines theextent of wage-wage versuswage-price
movements. A high asignifies inertia in nominalwages, while a low
asignifies a Wage-price response.
What can we say empirically aboutthe behaviour of wages since the
oil price shock of 1973? Table1 conveys the most importantinformation.
During 1973-75 real wage growth acceleratedover the previous trend in four+ -42- +






1960-731.82 3.34 4.98 6.66 8.54 2.86 - 8.34
1973-750.83 5.96 6.39 7.15 7.38 3.80 5.24
1973-76 2.22 -1.81 4.90 4.14 2.08 4.27 -0.01
1973-771.88 7.93 3.44 4.53 1.53 -1.83 2.42
Source: Real hourly earnings are calculated as average hourly compensation
in manufacturing deflated by the consumer price index. The wage
data are from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Office of Productivity ad Technology, Outputper Hour,
HourlyCompensation, and UnitLaborCosts in Manufacturing, Eleven
Countries, 19.50—1978; the price data are from theInternational
FinancialStatistics of the IMF.-43-
of the countries, and declined slightly in the United States and Italy and
moresharply in Japan. The acceleration occurred in spite of a massive supply
shock, high unemployment, and adverse productivity changes. After about
eighteen months of recession, wages began to decelerate in the four countrie.;
in 1976, and continued to do so in 1977. The first notable point is that reil
wage growth declines slowly in response to excess supply in the labour market.
Econometric evidence allows us to measure the real wage response to
unemployment and price changes. Phillips curve regressions are shown in
Table 2."' Canada and the United States display an aggregate wage
determination process that is distinct from the others. In these two
countries wage inflation is essentially unaffected by the level of lagged
unemployment, for given rates of past wage change and expected inflation.
Both countries also display a combined wage-wage, wage-price process. For
the other five economies, lagged unemployment has a significant depressing
effect on current nominal wage change. Equally important, ais small
(even negative) and is not statistically significant for the other five
economies, so that lagged wane inflation affects current wage change only
through its impact on expected price inflation. The estimates of
suggest that the oil shock may have had a direct effect on Japanese and
Italian wages, which did not operate through unemployment or price
inflation.
The implication of these regressions is best seen by rewriting (6)




- at(p- - (w -w)]+(ePcL
in the estimates, 9Sisproxied by a time trend; is set equal
tozero. -+ - 44- +
Table2.Wage Equations, 962_76a
































































d.w. 2.89 1.90 2.4 1.7 1.80 1.72 1.26
s.e. 0.003 0.017 0.016 0.025 0.036 0.007 0.018
necessarilywiththeerrorterm cr), and so may be omitted from the
regression. D74 is a dummy variable, equal to 1in 1974 and 0
otherwise. This is assumed to represent a direct effect of the oil price
shock which is not picked up by prices or unemployment. The equations are
estimated by ordinary least squares, with the Cochrane-Orcutt correction
for serial correlation (shown as ).Smallnumerals are t ratios.
Source:The wage and price data are the same as in Table 1. The expected
price variable is created by regressing prices on lagged prices,
wages, money supply, and the unemployment rate, andtakingfitted
values. Manhours is total hours worked in manufacturing, from the
same source as the wage data of Table 1.
a Inequation (6) in the text,
equation is estimated
forecast, :- PC
in the form of
is uncorrelated
is proxied by a
(8). With an
with the RF!S
simple time trend. The
efficient price
variables (though not- 45-
If
2> opolicy—makerscan reduce the real wage through inflationary
policy, even if the policy is fully expected. Expansionarymonetary policy
will raise income (see Sachs, 1978). Onthe other hand, for a =0,the
real wage is invariant to expected
inflation; a monetary expansion will
lead only to an equiproportiona
change in the exchange rate and domestic
prices.
We suspect that much of the differencein the macro-economic policy
recommendations cf American and Europeaneconomists stems from the
difference in the behaviour of theirrespective economies reflected in
2 In the United States
monetary policy is effective, while in most
European economies, monetary policyprobably operates chiefly on prices
and not on output.
Aggregate Demand and Investment Behaviour
We complete the simulation modelby specifying the determinants ofaggregate
demand. Since the demand side is lessnovel than the supply side, we
proceed quickly.
Aggregate consumption and final-goodsimports are functions of disposabie
income and the final-goods terms oftrade. It is assumed that total
household absorption is equal to 90per cent of disposable income. The
division of household expenditure between
imports, Cm) and domestic goods,
c, is assumed to depend on relative prices. A 1per cent increase in
world prices relative to domesticprices is assumed, in the longrun, to
cause a 0.8 peient decline in the ratio ofimported to domestic goods
in the consumer basket.Export demand is made a unit-elastic functionof
world income and the ternis of trade.
The investment demand equation is important in viewof the central role- 46-
ofdeclining investment inthe1974-75 downturn. Unfortunately, a
theoreticallysound investment equation requires a long-run model, with
explicit paths of capital accumulation and equity prices (see Blanchard,
1978). A less rigorous formulation is to write inv.stment as a. function
ofthe ratio of th current marginal product of capital tothe current
long-term cost of capital. If we can assume perfect capital nobility,
thedomestic long-term cost of capital is given approximately by the world
1evel.5For reasonable parameter values, we derive the following
investment schedule:6
(9) log(I) =-0.23-1.09(w- 008n-p)-6.5k.
Theregressions in Table 3show that this extremely simple investment
model can track much of the movement in fixed investment demand in recent
years.Notice that the coefficient of the worLdcostof capital, proxied by a
U.S. long-term real interest-rate measure, is negative and of reasonable
magnitude.The two real factor cOsts enter withappropriatenegative
The investmentdemand equation follows Kouri (l978a). iven with perfect
capital mobility, the domestic and world cost of capital need not be
exactlyequal. One can show that countries with worsening terms of
trade will have slightly higher long-term interest fates than countries
with improving terms of trade. Moreover, differences in tax treatment
of corporate income can create differences in the cost ofcorporate
borrowing,even under perfect capital mobility.
k6
Wetake investment demand to be a constant-elasticity function of
(Q/k)/kc with elasticity 0.5 .Fora firm on its supply curve,
Q/K K'[Q -L(Q/L)-N(Q/N)]=K'(Q-LW/P-NP/P).Thus,
Q/aK,the marginal product of capital, is also the profit per unit of
capital. Now, Q,L,and N are functions of W/P and Pa/P by
earlierarguments. Upon substitution for Q,L,N, and linearizing
aboutthe initial equilibrium, equation (9) is found.+ -47— +
Table3. Investment Demand Equations a





















































aEquations are estimated by ordinary least squares, with the Cochrane-
Orcutt correction, for annual data, 1962-76. kis the U.S. long-
term real cost of capital estimated by Feldstein and Summers (1978,
p. 87). It is computed as the long-term bond yield minus the long-term
expected rate of inflation. Small numerals are t ratios.
Source: Aggregate investment national accounts data of the OECD.
Average hourly compensation (w), as in Table 1. The price
indexes p and p are constructed by the authors, and are
described in Sachs(1978).- 48-
coefificients for all countries. However, theestimatedcoefficients of
(p-p)are throughout implausibly highcomparethem with the 0.08
coefficientin (9)]. Capital-energy complementaritycould in partaccount
forthe large coefficient. Wesuspect also that p -pis, to sonic extent,
proxying for an aggregate demandvariablethat might appear in an investment
equation in addition to the profit variable. Thatis, the coefficient of
p -palso reflects the effect on I of the 1974-75worldrecession.
Finally, n -pmight proxy for long-run expectations ofprofitability,
affecting I through stock-market prices.
According to the investment equations, it was not because ofexcessive
real interest rates due to contractionarymonetary POlicY that I dropped
in 1974 and 1975; the Fcldstein-Surnmers(1978) measure of the real long-
term interest rate fell from anaverage of 4 per cent for 1966-73, to 2½
per cent for 1974-76.
The simulation model is closed byspecifying the asset demand
structure and the process of expectations formation.For the simulations,
we assume a pegged though adjustable exchangerate. Assuming perfect
capital mobility, the domestic short-term nominal interestrate is equal
to the world level, as long as there isno expectation of devaluation. In
our theoretical work, we spell out the dynamics ofa freely floating
exchange rate, which can easily be simulated.
The entire model is now set, forth in Table 4. AllequaUons are
(1og linearized at the initial equilibrium.
SimulationResultsfor the Single-Economy Model
Inthis section we examine theresponse of the economy to an increase in— .-tj — +
Table4. Simulation Model
I. Structural Equations for theRepresentativeEconomya
Aggregate supply
P -0.359 +0.946w+0.054p + O.444q
-0.613+ L32[q-0.2(w-p)]
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m - = 0.Sq-0.5R
ee- e=R- t-it t t t
With fixed exchange rates, e and m is endogenous; with flexible
exchangerates, m is exogenous.
Expectationsb
For all X, = E(xtIQ.)
Footnoteson p. 51.+ -50- +
Table4. Simulation Model (contd)
II. NotationC
C Aggregate consumption of domestic final good
Cm Aggregate consumption of foreign final good
b
k Real cost of capital
E Exchange rate (units of domestic currency per foreign currency unit)
G Government expenditure





N Intermediate goods input
Consumer price index
P Domestic final-goods price
p* Foreign final-goods price (foreign currency units)
P Domestic intermediate input price
P Foreign intermediate input price (foreign currency units)
Q Grossoutput
R Nominal interest rate
taxDomestic tax rate




Footnotes on p. 51.Notes to Table 4
a
In the simulations, a (log) linearized version of this model is used.











formed at time t -jis denoted by t—j•
t -jupon which the expectations are
by When t-j includes the structural
we have the assumption of rational expectations
C
Except for k, all lower case variables are logarithms of upper case
variables; asterisk denotes foreign'. Note that superscript e
denotes expected value of variahl and superscript d denotes desired
level.
+ --)1 - +
b
The expectation of X
The information set at
conditioned is denoted
relations of the model,
as stated.+ -52- +
theworldprice of the intermediate good. Table S shows the dramatic
changes inthe relative price of fuels and other primary commodities from
1972-78.Energy prices, for whichthesimulation is designed, more than doubled
between 1973 and 1974. Tn the following years, the relative price ofoil
fellby 10 per cent (and itincreasedagain in 1979). Other primary
pricesdisplayed a more dramatic boom and bust, rising sharply in 1973-74,
and then falling sharply in 1975, with the onset of the world recession.
Our simulation considers a permanent doubling of worldenergy prices,
although the rise in all the other prices contributed to the world
stagflation, and their fall, no doubt aided the partial world recovery.
For our representative economy, the oil price rise requires a 6.4
per cent decline in real wages for full employment to be restored. Even
with long-run inelastic labour supply, output falls 0.8per cent, because
of substitution away from energy inputs. If the labour supply is perfectly
elastic, with real wages fixed at' their pre-shock level, output declines
by 4.5 per cent. Because the model is linear, we conclude that each 1
per cent fall in real wages boosts domestic output by 0.58 per cent.
The detailed discussion of short-run dynamics is postponed untilthe
two-country case. Here, we make some general observations about dynamic
adjustment. The wage determination process is important for the short-run
response of the economy to the price-hike. In the model, the oil price
rise is calculated to cause a one-year blip in the consumer price index
of about 1.5 per cent. Real wages fall in the year of the Price rise,





Source: Columns(1) and (2)
(April 1978), p. 3.
Column (3) from U.N., Statistical
Yearbook 1976, p. 58, and
U.N., Monthly Bulletin of Statistics(April 1978), p. 162.
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1960 84 85 101 1.0



















1973 133 156 177 1.2
1.2
1974 162 241 499 1.5
1.3
1975 182 191 541 1.1
3.1









aswell as current prices.7 If nominal wage change is linked half to
expected price and half to expected wage changes (a =0.5in the wage
equation), the unexpected jump of 1.5 per cent in the CPI in the year of the
oil price hike causes a 1.1 per cent fall in real wages in the sameyear.
As discussed in Section I, this temporary decline in w -cmitigates
the contractionary effects of the shock.
If long-run labour supply is highly inelastic (a 0), it is likely
that real wages, although unexpectedly reduced, are still above the
equilibrium level (2,S > d) given the sharp increase inunemployment in
the year of the shock. As w -
PC
falls in succeeding years, so does
p -e-p.With fixed e and p, the nominal price level p declines.
On the other hand, if workers try to make up for the temporary decline in
real wages (consistent with an elastic long-run labour supply), inflation
will continue in future periods as w -p
rises. It should be remembered,
though, that the behaviour of thepricelevel is determined more by the
exchange rate e than by the real terms of trade, p -e-p.
The importance of the exchange rate in domestic inflation is shown
by a simulated 10 per cent devaluation. Real wages fall temporarily and
output and employment expand. In our representative economy, the
devaluation causes an increase of about 5 per cent in prices in the first
"Thesize of the real wage decline in the year of the shock depends upon
the extent of the formal indexation provisions in labour contracts. In
our model, nominal wage change is linked to expected price inflation by
the term (1 -a)(e
-p )inwage equation (8). In the simulations
2C1C1
we assume that one halfof the linkage isto actual and one half to expected
prices. The term becomes (l -a)
- +(l -a)':1+ —55- +
year,with the remaining 5percent increase distributed in succeeding
years. Thelatter price increase is brought a1out by the rise in
real wages, generated bytherise in demand forlabourafter the
devaluation.
Simulation Resu its for the 2o-Country Model
In Section II, we described how an import price shock can shift a many-
country aggregate supply frontier. Following a suggestion of Fair (1979.)
it is easy to illustrate the interactions between countries with our simulation
model.We link the industrial economy to a mirror image1 making the
exports of one equal to the imports of the other. Various experiments are
then performed by changing the structural labour market characteristics
in one of the countries. In this model, we assume that the two industrial
countries import oil from OPEC, which export oil but not industrial goods.
At this point, OPEC consumption behaviour is not modelled; we assume for
simplicity that oil revenues are saved in the short run (no new theoretical
issues are raised by including OPEC spending on industrial exports).
For two identical economies, the effect of a real oil price shock is
easily adduced. Assume that the price of oil doubles in terms of a basket
of the two countries' final goods, with each final good having equal weight
in the basket. We again appeal to the aggregate supply relation (5).
Since the countries are mirror images, the terms of trade, p-p-e,must
remain unchanged, by symmetry. Also, w -PC
15fixedin the short run,
by assumption. Therefore, the output effect of the oil shock is
(10) =_______ - = -(O.l2)log(2.O)=-0.083,
i.e. 8.3percent.- 56-
An8.3 per cent decline in output might seem rather large. Of course,
at this point real wages have n,t been allowed to decline at all in reaction
to the jump in unemployment. Each subsequent fall of 1 per cent in the
real wage in both countries produces a 2.3 per cent increase inoutput.
Real wages must decline at least 3.5 per cent in each country for full
employment to he restored.
What happens to theworldreal rate of interest along the adjustment
path? Simply, kfalls if the global aggregate demand effect exceeds
the aggregate supply effect just measured, as would be thecase for the
real interest rate in a closed-economy model. Given ourassumptions,
the deflationary demand effect of the oil shock dominates after thefirst
year. Real interest rates jump 40 basis points in the year of the shock,
and then fall 120 basis points in the two succeedingyears. Very modest
support for this effect is offered by the nieastires of the U.S. long-run
real interest rates inFeldsteinand Summers (1978). They find that the
long-term U.S. corporate bond rate minus the rate of long-term expected
inflation fell from an average of 4.1 per cent for 1966-73, to 2.6per cent
for 1974-76, after the oil shock.
When the economies have different fiscal policies, different rates
of domestic energy production, or differentpatterns of real wage change1
the final-goods terms of trade vary during the adjustmentpath. Consider
the case where the home country has rapid real-wage adjustment and inelastic
labour supply, while the foreign country has slowerwage adjustment and
long-run labour supply inelasticity.8 The effect of the oil shock is
For this simulation, the home country labour-marketparameters are
=0.3,a =0,a =0,while the foreign country values are 1 2 3
a0.1,a =0, a =3.0.
1 2 3+ -57-.
Table 6. The 1974 Oil Price Rise:Output, Trade Balance,
and Real Wage Effects in theTwo-Country Model
1973 1974 1975 1976 Long-run
W/PC 1.16 1.16 1.12 1.11 1.10
(W/pc)* 1.16 1.16 1.15 2.15 1.15
Q 1.63 1.50 1.58 1.60 1.62
Q* 1.63 1.50 1.57 1.59 1.59
PX -
P*ECm 0 0 0.01 0.015 0.02
-(P/E)C*0 0 -0.01 -0.015 -0.02+ - 58— +.
illustratedin Table 6.'Ihe initial 8.3 per cent output decline is the
same in both countries. At home, w -PCfalls more rapidly and output
expands more quickly. Since long-run w -PCis lower at home, long-run
output is higher.
The following results, easily established analytically, are suggested:
1. A real wage decline in one country causes real income to rise in both
countries.
2. A long-run real wage increase in one country lowers real wages in the
other. '
3.The economy with the larger real wage decline, ceteris paribus,
experiencesa trade surplus; the other economy, of course, has an
equal and opposite deficit.
A fourth proposition, not evident from the table is:
4. The economy with greater domestic produc"tion of oil experiences a
smaller decline in output than does the other.
Flow does the simulation estimate of an 8.3 per cent impact effect on
output compare with actual magnitudes of output decline in the industrial
economies? Table 7 gives a very rough measure. Actually, the 8.3 per
cent is a mid-range estimate of the decline of GNP relative to trend for
the four countries. One interesting source of intercountry variation is
Canada. The recession in Canada is late and relativ.ly small. This is no
doubt a reflection of our proposition 4: Canada is a net exporter of
When both countries have long-run labour supply inelasticity, real wages
must decline by 3.5 per cent to restore full employment. Now the
country with inelastic labour supply experiences a 5.0 per cent wage
decline, because real wages fail to drop significantly in the other
economy.+ - 59- +






1973 0.8 2.2 0.3 1.3
1974 -5.6 -1.5 -3.6 -0.9
1975 -10.5 -0.6 -10.6 -5.4
a
The deviation from trend is measured by regressing log(GNP) on time.
The 1973 entry is the regression residual. For 1974-75, deviations of
actual GNP from projected trend values are computed.
Source: OECD.+ -60- b +
energy resources. The calculations are meant only to hint at plausible
measures for the output decline in the recession years. We are now
preparinga more detailed inter—country comparison of outputand price
responsesin the 1970s.
As a final experiment, consider the case of Hxcd exchange rates and
sticky nominal wages. The oil shock has a less contractionary impact effect
than is reported above. Assume a given world stock of money and Cambridge
d
0.2
moneydemand functions in each country of the form M =PQ ,where
0.2 is the assumed short-run income elasticity of demand for money. The
decline in output that follows the oil shock will cause prices to rise.
With two identical countries, each 1 per cent decline in income leads to
a 0.2 per cent rise in prices. The unexpected rise in prices following
an oil price increase will reduce real wages in the short-run, as in the
one-country model. When short-run indexation (see note 47) is 0.5, a
doubling of oil prices causes a 1.4 per cent unexpected spurt in prices.
Real wages are reduced by 0.5 X 1.4% =0.7%in the first period.
Consequently, the output decline is reduced from 8.3 to 6.7 per cent in
the first year.+ -61-, -
I!'.CONCLUDING i?LMAI?]W
Thismay be an opportune moment to suggest directions for further research.
Theoretical models of open economies must be extendedto allow for both
classical and Keyflesia11unem)loyment, whose relativeimportance has been a
general issue in our paper. Econometric work might be usedto determine
more precisely how much of the 'great recession' was in fact classicalor
Keynesian. New statistical techniques for markets indisequilibrium offer
tools for careful empirical research in this direction.
Our simulation did not address thesharp temporary rise in non-fuel
commodity prices in 1972-73, though that temporary shock raisesimportant
questions. Its additional effect on to!) of (and preceding) the oilprice
rise was to deepen the stagflation of the mid-l970s.Once world output fell
and excess supply of those commodities forced theirprice down, the effect
on domestic final-goods markets would imply a rightward shift ofthe supply
curve. With domestic prices rigid downward, a ratchet effectmay have
developed, turning a temporary supply shock into morepermanent Keynesian
unemployment.
Next we note the pc!ar view of exchange ratesas either determined by
perfect capitai mobiiity or fixed. The role of the currentaccount and
imperfect capital mobility, along the linesrecently modelled by Kouri
(l978b), should be explicitly incorporated into thesystem.
On the basis of the preliminarycomparative country estimates given
here, especially with respect to labour market behaviour,it can be seen that
there is room for considerable additionalanalysis of the differences in
patterns of institutional behaviour and policyresponses between countries.
Let us stress again that this paper hasexplicitly confined itself to+ -62- +
short-runaspects of economic developments. One central long-run issue is
that of capital accumulation. For a full analysis of a supply shock,
explicit account irust be taken of the repe:'cuss.ons cn long-run capacity
and growth levels. It seems very likely that OECD countries have notonly
suffered a short-term set-back but are now on a !owerlong-run growth path
although oil alone cannot explain that.
As a final long-run issue with short-term nolicy implicationsone
should mention a development which has become important in
the 1970s. We have in mind the internal structural implications for.the
highly industrialized economies of the rapid growth of manufacturing
exports by semi-industrialized LDCs. These have been completely ignored in
the present paper although for. some OECD countries, this isgradually
becoming a major issue. In at least one respect, however, the analysis of
this quesion would fall quite naturally into thegeneral approach that we
would like to advocate. Short-term price andoutput adjustments and real
structural changes may be very hard t- keep apart..-63-
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